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~.'Il"~+ ..... of RUBY SARGA VAK, Deceased. J. G. OHANNE-
SON et &1., Respondents, v. ADRINE LAMBRINIDOU 
et &1., Appellants; H. KURKJIAN et &1., Contestants and 
Respondents. 
Wills-Testamen~ Writinp-Intent.-Before an instrument 
may be probated as a will it must appear from its terms, viewed 
in the light of the surrounding circumstances, that it was exe-
cuted with testamentary intent. The testator must have in-
tended by the particular instrument offered for probate, to 
make a revocable disposition of his property to take effect on 
his death. 
Id.-Testamentary Writings-Showing of Intent-Extrinsic 
Evidence.-Regardless of the language of an allegedly testa-
mentary instrument, extrinsic evid~nce may be introduced to 
show that it was not intended by the testator to be effective 
aaawilL 
leL-Testamentary Writings-Showing of Intent-Extrinsic 
Evidence.-Since extrinsic evidence is admissible to show the 
absence of testamentary intention, it does not become inad-
missible because it does so by showing another intention. 
Writings-Showing of Intent-Extrinsic 
.. Evidence.-Oral declarations of the testatrix before and after 
the execution of the instrument in question are admissible, if 
offered for the purpose of ascertaining the intent with which 
instrument was ~xecuted, and not for the purpose of prov-
the meaning the testatrix attributed to specific provisions 
admitted will. 
IcL-'J~est:amentary Writings-Showing of Intent.-Although 
was uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence that dece-
annoyance with the niece of her deceased husband and 
niece's daughter prompted the writing of the alleged 
·AO.lograp,n1C instrument reciting that she left "everything she 
two named men, but there was nothing in the evidence 
the trial court which clearly negatived the testamentary 
"'}loU"".'\J'" carried by those words, and there was other evi-
decedent intended to make the disposition of her 
manifested by the terms of the instrument, the evi-
26. Cal.Jur. 868; 57 Am.Jur. 45. 
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dence supported a finding that such instrument was uecuted 
with testamentary intent. . 
[8] Id.-Testamental'J Writings-Dual Character.-The inclusion 
of non testamentary provisions in an instrument with those of 
a testamentary nature does not make the instrument inopera-
tive &&I a will. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County admitting to probate a codicil to a will which 
had been previously admitted to probate. Kurtz Kauffman, 
Judge. Affirmed. 
Robert M. Dulin, Melvin E. Fink, Spurgeon Avakian and 
Schell & Delamer for Appellants. 
O. W. Byrer, Charles E. Hobart, Cameron & Perkins and 
W. E. Oameron for Respondents. 
THE COURT .. -Contestants appeal from an order admitting 
a holographic instrument to probate as a codicil toa previously 
admitted witnessed will. Ruby Sargavak died March 22, 194!1. 
By a formal will drawn by respondent Ohanneson as her 
attorney and executed July 9, 1945, she left all her property 
to the appellants. Respondent Mahdesian, as executor under 
that will, offered it for probate on March 31, 1947. On May 6. 
1947, respondent Ohanneson offered the following instrument 
for probate as a codicil to that will: 
To WHOM IT MAY OONCERN: 
AI 1566 W -29th St. 
Los Angeles 7. Cal. 
Sep 29.1946 
Sunday Evening 
I the writer---:.Mrs Rqby Salogavak waritS--everyonetokriow 
that she is writing these lines of her own free will-no one is 
putting her eI or urging her to do it. She leaves everything 
she has to her Boy Sam Mahdesian & her layer, J. G. Ohanne-
son-6he gives them power of attorney to divide what is left 
of her belongings to them. She specifically advises to give 
,nothing what so ever to Mrs. Lillian Shooshan-she is no 
relation nor friend of hers~Mrs. Sargavak has been more 
than kind to her. just because she begged us to help her for 
a little time-Mrs. Sargavak would rather help her very own 
nieces & grand nieces & perfect strangers, who are truly in 
need of help. God has been good to us, she did not appreciate 
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goodness of the Lord to her. All honor & glory unto his 
and Holy Name! Mrs. Ruby Sargavak. 
',P. S. It is 8 o'clock, I am very tired--
Ruby Sargavak." 
contested the admission of this instrument on 
ground that testatrix did not intend it as a testamentary 
.di!Irpoisltl:on of her property. They introduced without objec-
evidence to show that testatrix intended the instrument 
an authorization to respondents to eject Mrs. Lillian Shoo-
from the testatrix's house. Respondent Mahdesian testi-
to declarations of the testatrix that the allegedly disposi-
, provisions were intended only as a statement that her 
:att:OrJley and her executor were to dispose of her property 
to the terms of the will of JUly 9, 1945. Respondent 
,UlilaIlDe~SOlll, as the only proponent of the codicil, offered no 
{,M.·nn'"rli"t."' .... evidence, relying solely upon the allegedly clear 
of the instrument. The trial court found that the 
'im;ltrtlmlmt was executed with testamentary intent and ad-
it to probate as a codicil to the will. 
question is raised as to compliance with Probate Code. 
_lIICt:W\j,U 53. or as to Mrs. Sargavak's testamentary capacity. 
contend only that the uncontradicted evidence 
discloses that the testatrix did not execute the instru-
&llJJ.ellt with testamentary intent. Respondent, however, urges 
the extrinsic evidence was improperly admitted and 
.,,~~uu not be considered on that issue. He contends that when 
is clear and tmambiguous on its face, extrinsic evidence 
be admitted to show that it was not a will. This con-
cannot be upheld. 
Before an instrument may be probated as a will it 
a.!~n appear from its terms. viewed in the light of the sur-
circumstances, that it was executed with testa-
intent. The! testator must have intended, by the 
.1~p.!~i~~ulllU' instrument offered for probate, to make a revocable 
of his property to take effect upon his death. 
Richardson, 94 Cal. 63 [29 P. 484, 15 L.R.A. 635]; 
_",un, UI of Spencer, 87 Cal.App.2d 591 [197 P.2d 351] ; Haberg-
,v. Vincent, 2 Ves.Jr. 204; Succession of Torlage, 202 La. 
,[12 So.2d 683J ; Mayhew v. Wt"lhelm, 249 Mich. 640 [229 
459J ; In re McOune's Estate, 265 Pa. 523 [109 A. 156J ; 
"~4ta~e of Button, 209 Cal. 325, 331 [287 P. 964J; In re Wt"l-
1UJ9~18: _ Estate, (Tex.Civ.App.) 135 S.W.2d 1078; OZark v. 
130 Va. 99 [107 S.E. 730]; Thompson, Willa, § 12.) 
) 
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It bears emphasis that we are here concerned not with the 
meaning of the instrument, but with the intention with which 
it was executed.· [2] Regardless of the language of the 
allegedly testamentary instrument, extrinsic evidence may 
be introduced to show that it was not intended by the testator 
to be effective as a will. (Estate of Janes, 18 Cal.2d 512, 515 
[116 P.2d 438] ; Austin v. First Trust &- Savings Bank, 343 
m. 406, 414 [175 N.E. 554] ; In re Kemp's Will, 37 Del 514, 
523 [186 A. 890] ; In re Estate of Soper, 196 Minn. 60 [264 
N.W. 427] ; Estate of Kenyon, 42 Cal.App.2d 423 [109 P.2d 
38].) Thus, an instrument that clearly appears testamentary 
may nevertheless be shown by extrinsic evidence to have been 
executed in jest (Nichols v. Nichols, 2 Phill.Ecc. 180 j Trevelyan 
v. Trevelyan, 1 Phill.Ecc. 149), or as a threat to induce action 
by an interested party (Lister v. Smith, 3 S.&T. 282), or 
under the misapprehension that the instrument was a mort-
gage (In re Williams' Estate (Tex.Civ.App.), 135 S.W.2d 
1078), or to induce the "legatee" to engage in illicit relations 
with the testator (Fleming v. Morrison, 187 Mass. 120 [72 
N.E. 499]), or to relieve the maker from annoyance by a' 
would-be legatee. (Estate of Siemers, 202 Cal. 424, 435 [261 
P.298J ; see 1 Page, Wills, § 53.) 
Respondent relies upon a dictum in Estate of PageZ, 52 
Cal.App.2d 38, 42 [125 P.2d 853], that, although extrinsic 
evidence can be admitted to show that the writer did not intend 
the writing in question to operate as a will, such evidence can-
not be admitted to show that he intended it to operate as an 
instrument different from what on its face it purports to be. 
Respondent therefore contends that the evidence is inad-
missible because it shows that the testatrix intended to execute 
a power of attorney. [3] The intention of the testatrix is 
here material only in showing that she did not intend that the 
instrument operate as a will. Since extrinsic evidence is admis-
sible to show the absence of testamentary intention, it does 
not become inadmissible because it does 80 by showing another 
intention. 
[4] The extrinsic evidence in this case consists .for the most 
part of the oral declarations of the testatrix before and after 
the execution of the instrumenrin question. Such declarations, 
-There fa an analogy in the use of extrinsic evidence, including 
subsequent acts and deelaratious of tho. grantor, to prove delive~ of 
a deed, likewise turning on a question of intention independent of 
the terms of the deed itself. (Whitlow v. Durst, 20 Ca1.2d 523, 524-5J5 
[127 P.2d 530] ; Donah1l.6 v. 8w~ew.e1l, 171 Cal 388, 391-392 (l5a P. 708]; 
W4UiomI v. llitW, 110 CaL 181, 6d (151 P. 1, .A.m1.Ou. 1916. 708).) 
) 
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~;whether made at, before, or after the· execution of the instru-
finent are admissible, if offered for the purpose of ascertaining 
. the intent with which the instrument was executed (Estate of 
... U' .............. 202 Cal. 424, 435-436 [261 P. 298]; In re Kemp', 
37 Del. 514, 523 [186 A. 890J ; Fleming v. MorrisonJ 187 
120,122 [72 N.E. 499J ; Olark v. Hugo, 130 Va. 99 [107 
730, 734J ; 6 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1736, p. 111; 1 Under-
Wills, § 39, p. 48), and not for the purpose of proving 
meaning the testator attributed to specific provisions of 
admitted will. (Oolton v. OoZtfm, 127 U.S. 300 [8 S.Ct. 
32 L.Ed. 138] ; Estate of Pierce, 32 Ca1.2d 265, 274 [196 
1] ; Estate of FareUy, 214 Cal. 199, 203 [4 P.2d 948] ; 
Code, § 105.) "Such . . . declarations of intent to make 
. will are admissible when the attempt is not to explain an 
g",nhi...,'itv but to show the testamentary character of a letter." 
ftBr,tate of Spie" 86 Cal.App.2d 87, 91 [194 P.2d 83] ; E,tate 
_ .. ".,.. .... 18 Cal.2d 512, 516 [116 P.2d 438] ; Estate of Siemer" 
Cal. 424, 435 [261 P. 298] ; Estate 01 Morrison, 198 Cal. 
6-8 [242 P. 939] ; EBtate 01 Spitzer, 196 Cal. 301, 306 [237 
].) 
BBtate 01 Smith, 31 Cal.2d 563 [191 P.2d 4131, is not incon-
!aiiJteIlt with the foregoing. That case involved an unequivocal 
!ti'nre88 revocatory intent unaccompanied by any declaration 
.·oo:ndlilct of the decedent inconsistent therewith. There was 
endellce against the showing of the solemnly expressed 
coexistent with the execution of the revocatory instru-
The evidence established only that testatrix iIiformed 
persons that she had made a will, the provisions of which 
those of the instrument offered for probate. She did not 
to the earlier revo6ation and offered no explanation of 
Win.luonn" .. in writing it. A written revocation can be over-
by evidence that revocation was not intended, not 
r··e'nacen<le that at some later time the testatrix wished the 
be operative. The evidence of the decedent's subsequent 
dec:1ar'atllons and conduct was held inadmissible because 
. no bearing or relevancy under the facts to show an 
different from that unequivocally expressed by the 
voeatOlry writing. None of it disclosed conduct, or influences, 
of mind at the time of the written revocation. Nor 
declarations refer to the previous revocation. The 
there relied on merely supported an inlerence that 
~e(ledlent considered her will operative. The majority of 
) 
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this co:urt expressly recognized that the effect of such a duly 
executed express revocatory instrument could not thus be 
overcome. 
This appeal does not present a case in which the trial court 
erroneously excluded relevant extrinsic evidence. The evi-
dence was admitted and considered by the trial court in deter-
mining whether the instrument offered for probate was exe-
cuted with testamentary intent. The trial court concluded 
that "said decedent executed said instrument of date of Sep-
tember 29, 1946, with the intention to create a revocable dispo-
sition of her property to accrue and take effect only upon her 
death and pasSing no present interest' 'and that "said intent 
to make such testamentary disposition of her property existed 
at the time of the execution of said instrument. " 
[5] It is true, as contestants assert, that the evidence of 
decedent's declarations relative to the execution of the instru-
ment is uncontradicted and unimpeached. This evidence, 
however, is not so persuasive and unequivocal that it compels 
the conclusion that decedent did not intend to make the testa-
mentary disposition of her property that the instrument 
directs. It only creates a conflict with other evidence intro-
duced at the trial that supports the finding of the trial court. 
Mrs. Lillian Shooshan was the niece of testatrix's deceased 
husband; she had been living with the testatrix on hostile 
terms. On the day the instrument was written she had been 
particularly quarrelsome, insisting that she had been wrong-
fully excluded from the wills of the testatrix and her husband. 
According to the testimony of her nurse, Mrs. Sargavak deter-
mined to have Mrs. Shooshan ejected from her house, and 
called 'respondent Mahdesian for that purpose. When she 
learned that he could Inot come that evening, she wrote the 
instrument in question. The nurse testified in detail eon-
eerning the circumstances under which it was written: 
., Q. Did you call Mr. Mahdesian at that time' A. I called 
him that night. She asked me to call him and come and have 
them put out of the house. 
"Q. By referring to them, who did she mean' A. Mrs. 
Lillian Shoostian [Shooshan] and Betty. her daughter. 
"Q. You did call Mr. Mahdesian at her requesU A. I did, 
and she called him also. 
"Q. She called him' A. Yes. 
"Q. Do you know what she said to him, A. She asked him 
) 
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come over; she wanted these parties put out of her house 
~;I)ec:awle they had disturbed her so all day." 
The nurse also testified: 
". , .. ' She said she had been so disturbed that day and was so 
tired and worn out from trouble she had annoying her all 
long with her niece and her niece's daughter; that she 
't want them to be in her will at all, and she was writing 
to fix it so they would know she didn't want them to have 
to do with her will. " 
,Kesp.:>D(lelllt Mahdesian saw the testatrix the next day and 
ijsclWlSE!d the situation with her (Rep. Tr., pp. 27-29) : 
Q. What happened when you got there Monday morning' 
was just around eleven o'clock when I got there Monday 
and greeted her. She was in bed. 
She says' Where have you been' Why didn't you 
",<> •• ~"'~rI~'''''' Which I gave her the reason why I didn't. 
, she says, 'I want you to help me. Don't you know I 
trouble" 
said, 'Now let me worry about your troubles. What is 
said, 'I want you to get Mrs. Shoostian out of the 
away. I can't stand her any more. ' 
.' What is the trouble" 
said, 'She is always harassing me, nagging me, and 
me why we didn't leave anything for her in Harry's 
uncle's will; why we gave so much money to the 
and benevolent organizations,' andshesaid,' That 
me. So I told her~hatis my oWn money. We can do 
we want with our money.' She says, 'Again yester-
me and quarreled with me all day, so I 
something over here. I want you to take it and 
read it. I said, 'What do you want us to do t' 
. . 'Put Lillian Shoostian out of the house right 
'Mrs. Sargavak, Mrs. Shoostian [Shooshan] is your 
's niece. He has just passed away a short time ago, 
. . '. put her out of the house people will say she was 
her husband to die to put the relatives out.' I said, 
Mrs. Shoostian.Just leave that to me.' 
'Well, you know what best to do.' 
I looked at the instrument and I said, 'What 
me to do with this" 
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"She said, ' As I told you, Mrs. Shoostian has been bothering 
me and demanding money from me, and I am writing this 
and I want you to take it and any time you need it to use it.' 
"I said, 'Now what do you mean by this, that you want to 
leave your belongings to your son, Sam Mahdesian and her 
attorney, J. George Ohanneson and give them power Of 
attorneyf' 
" Well, she said, ' You' are the executor of Harry's estate, 
and also you are the executor in my will, and Mr. Ohanne80n 
is our attorney. I want you folks to prepare and take care of 
my estate, my affairs, in the way that you know I want it. 
And whenever Lillian Shoostian ever gives any trouble, I 
want you to have this.' .. . 
The foregoing testimony indicates only that decedent'. 
annoyance with Mrs. Shooshan and her daughter prompted the 
writing of the instrument. If it was intended, as contestants 
assert, only as a notification to Mrs. Shooshan and her daughter 
that decedent" didn't want them to be in her will at all," the 
testimony offers no explanation for the statement that "She 
leaves everything she has to her Boy Sam Mahdesian & her 
layer J. G. Ohanneson." Nothing in the evidence before the 
trial court clearly negatives the testamentary implication 
carried by those words. The impulse that prompted decedent 
to exclude Mrs. Shooshan from any share in her estate does 
not dispel the inference that at the same time she directed the 
disposition of her property to the two men who had served 
her and her husband as friends, counsel, and business advisers. 
Although the testimony of Mahdesian and the nurse is 
uncontradicted, other evidence introduced at the trial sup-
ports the inference that Mrs. Sargavak intended to make the 
disposition of her property manifested by the terms of the 
instrument. Decedent and her husband knew Mahdesian since 
1906. They frequently referred to him as "our boy" and 
"our son" and relied upon his aid and advice in the conduct 
of business matters. At the time she wrote the instrument 
offered for probate, decedent contemplated transferring title 
to her home to Mahdesian if he and his wife would live with 
her. Decedent and her husband knew Ohanneson since 1904. 
Ohanneson met and courted his wife at their home. Mrs. Sar-
gavak assisted in the delivery of Mrs. Ohanneson's first child 
in 1913. Ohanneson represented the Sargavaks as their attor-
ney. He was closely associated with Mr. Sargavak in religious 
and charitable activities. He was a constant visitor at Mrs. 
) 
) 
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bedside during the extended illness that eventually 
~Cause:d her death. . 
. It cannot be said that it is unreasonable upon this evidence 
conclude that Mrs. Sargavak, angered and harassed by Mrs; 
rB1IlOOl!Ih&11l, decided to leave. her property to two men she had 
ftJIlOWn for more than forty years and for whom she had dem-
rDJIiStrateid a warm personal affection. This purpose is clearly 
'~pl'E~d by the terms of the instrument. It is not negatived 
evidence that she had an additional purpose, expressed in 
. letter and corroborated by the testimony upon which con-
Dstants rely, to avoid further annoyance from Mrs. Shooshan. 
'. The inclusion of nontestamentary provisions with those of 
lIl.testllUDlmtl!l.l'y' nature does not make the instrument moper&-
88 a wiU. (Estate of Button, 209 Cal. 325, 331 [287 P. 
) 
order admitting the insttument to probate is aftirmed. 
,p"/~~",,'.u ..... , J.-I concur. It should be noted, however, that 
IP.,A ...... VA£ .. .J hlold:ing here that "Regardless of the language 
aDegedly testamentary instrument, extrinsic evidence 
. be introduced to show that it was not intended by the 
to be effective as a will . • . Since extrinsic evidence 
'~adnwlBiblle to show the absence of testamentary intention, 
not become inadmissible because it does so by showing 
intention," is irreconcilably inconsistent with the 
holding in Esiate of Smith (1948), 31 Cal.2d 563, 
P .2d 413], that eVidence of "extraneous occurrences 
(~ecIllratiOltl8 claimed to bear upon the intent to revoke" 
not ~ received, "cannot overcome the valid [on its 
U,lmlIlSrevocation," and is "not admissible to show that 
~~. [on its face] revocation clause W88 not intended to 
prior wiU. " 
bas been suggested no tenable basis for applying an 
-Dal7 rule of evidence to the question of intent arising 
"""T~.'--'- case and a contrary rule to the same question 
now before us. For the sake of uniformity of 
either the majority holding of the Smith case should 
ijcRiarelly overruled or it should be followed here and all 
the subject of intent be held inadmissible. 
J.-I dissent. 
ift&/m....,.. in the opinion of the court that resort may always 
extrinsic evidence to explain the actual intention 
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with which an apparently testamentary instrument was exe-
cuted and that the trial court properly admitted such evidf'nce 
In my opinion. however, that ('vidence, unequivocal, uncon· 
tradicted. and unimpeached, clearly demonstrates that Mrs. 
Sargavak did not intend by the letter of September 29. 1946. 
to direct the testamentary disposition of her property and 
the letter !;hould not have been admitted to probate. 
It is held that since the letter furnishes rational support 
for the finding of the trial court that it was executed with 
testamentary intent, the finding must be affirmed on appeal. 
The cases cited for the proposition that the extrinsic evidence 
was properly admitted, however, are also authority for the 
proposition that a finding of testamentary intent contrary to 
that evidence cannot be upheld even though it is supported 
by the terms and appearance of the questioned instrument. If 
the instrument cannot reasonably be found to be testamentary 
when read alone, there is no need to resort to extrinsic evi-
dence. In most of the cited cases, not only was the language of 
the instrument indicative of testamentary intent, it was not 
indicative of any other. Nevertheless, when the evidence 
clearly demonstrates that the instrument so construed does 
not represent the true intention of the writer, it must be denied 
probate. (Estate of Kenyon, 42 Cal.App.2d 423, 425 (l09 
P.2d 38J ; Estate of Major, 89 Cal.App. 238, 242 [264 P. 542J ; 
Smith v. Smith, 112 Va. 205 [70 S.E. 491] ; Rennie v. Wash-
ington Trust 00., 140 Wash. 472 [249 P. 992] ; see 1 Under-
hill, Wills, § 39, pp. 47-48.) Thus in the case of a law student 
who draws a practice will solely as a classroom exercise, uncon-
tradicted evidence of this fact by the instructor and members 
of the class would overcome any indication of testamentary 
intent from the instrument itself. Although such an instru-
ment might be written meticulously and in strict conformity 
with statutory requirements, it would not be entitled to pro-
bate, since the writer would not intend that it accomplish a 
testamentary disposition of his property. 
Sometimes extrinsic evidence offered to contradict the 
apparently testamentary character of an instrument estab-
lishes that the decedent executed the instrument written in 
terms not his own, the legal import of which he neither real-
ized nor intended, as in In re WiUiams' Estate (Tex.Civ. 
App.) , 135 S.W.2d 1078, where the decedent executed the 
instrument under the impression that it was a mortgage. 
Again, the evidence may establish that the decedent executed 
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~. even that he intended .that the instrument appear to be 8 
r will, but that his actual design was not that the instrument 
~ have testamentary effeci~ but that it serve a nontestamentary 
;' purpose not embodied in the instrument. (Lister v. Smith, 3 
( S.iT. 282; Estate o/Siemers, 202 Cal. 424, 435 [261 P. 298] ; 
! 1'leming v. Morrison, 187 Mass. 120, 123 [72 N.E. 499].) In 
t:11leming v. MOf'f"ison, supra, the decedent, to induce a young 
woman to engage in illicit relations with him, executed a 
'.' formal witnessed instrument designed to appear as a will, 
;n8ming her as' sole legatee. He showed it to her as hii will, 
. Ultending actually that it have no testamentary effect. The 
trial court, relying upon the testamentary appearance of the 
< instrument, admitted it to probate. The appellate court 
• reversed the order of admission, holding that it WflS error for 
·the trial court to attribute any weight to the testamentary 
'appearance of the instrument, since the decedent did not 
mtend the instrument to be testamentary .. (See, also, Estate 
.:'1 Kenyon, 42 Cal.App.2d 423, 425 [109 P.2d 38].) In each 
'of the foregoing cases, the writer of the instrument did not 
~ihereby express or intend to express his actual intention; 
:the terms of the instrument were designed to have .no operative 
t effect. The courts have therefore consistently held that when 
kthe evidence of the writer's actual intention is clear, convinc-
iiDg, and uncontradicted it is error to rely on evidence of a 
feontrary intention appearing from the terms of the instru-
t~'J.Ilent alone. (Olark v. Hugo, 130 Va. 99 [107 S.E. 730, 733] ; 
.,.. re Williams' Estate (Tex.Civ.App.), 135 S.W.2d 1078, 
,ibs2; Estate 0/ Kenyon, 42 Cal.App.2d 423, 425 [109 P.2d 38] ; 
"-;#ennie v. Washington Trust 00., 140 Wash. 472, 479 [249 
.:P.992] ; In re Willing's Estate, 212 Pa. 136 [61 A. 812, 814] ; 
, " ession 01 Torlage, 202 La. 693, 698.) 
f,Often, however,!the evidence will indicate that the decedent 
tight to accomplish a specific purpose by the terms of the 
,- ent and that this intention was expressed, although' 
tJnperfectly, by the words chosen, but that the intention was 
~~ntestamentary .. That is this case. The court cannot disre-
~pd, the terms of the instrument but must construe them 
. ther with the extrinsic evidence to determine their mean-
." .. When the construction of the instrument is based solely 
"its terms without the aid of extrinsic evidence, or with the 
. ~'of extrinsic evidence that is without conffict, "it is the 
. . of the appellate court . . . to interpret the document 
, ependent of the construction· given to it by the trier of 
fJ " 
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the fact, and to make a final determination in accordance with 
the applicable principles of law." (Estate of Norris, 78 Cal. 
App.2d 152, 159 [177 P.2d 299] ; Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 
343,352 [131 P.2d 825] ; Union Oil Co. v. Union Suga,. Co., 
31 Ca1.2d 300, 306, 318 [188 P.2d 470J ; Trubowitch v. River. 
bank Canning Co., 30 Cal.2d 335, 339 [182 P.2d 182] ; Western 
Coal ~ Mining Co. v. Jones, 27 Ca1.2d 819, 826-827 [167 P.2d 
719, 164 A.L.R. 685] ; First Trust ~ Savings Bank v. Costa, 
83 Cal.App.2d 368, 372 (188 P.2d 778] ; Estate of O'Brien, 
74 Cal.App.2d 405, 407 [168 P.2d 432J; Lane· Wells Co. v. 
8cklttmberger WeZl Su,.veying Corp., 65 Cal.App.2d 180, 184 
[150 P.2d 251] ; Moffatt v. Tight,44 Cal.App.2d 643, 648 [112 
P.2d 910] ; Landres v. Rosasco, 62 Cal.App.2d 99, 105 [144 
P.2d20].) 
In the present case, the extrinsic evidence is clear and 
unequivocal, uncontradicted and unimpeached. It demon· 
strates unmistakably that Mrs. Sargavak did not intend to 
direct a testamentary disposition of her property by the letter 
offered for probate. On the basis of that evidence, the letter 
should be denied probate notwithstanding the contrary find· 
ing of the trial court. (See In re Kimmel's Edate, 278 Pa. 
435 [123 A. 405,406].) 
The testimony of Mrs. Sargavak's nurse, set forth at length 
in the opinion of the court, demonstrates that the only motive 
for writing the letter was nontestamentary. No other con· 
struction can reasonably be placed on the testimony that: 
"She said she had been so disturbed that day and was so 
very tired and worn out from trouble she had annoying her all 
day long with her niece and her niece's daughter; that she 
didn't want them to be in her will at all, and she was writing 
this to fix it so they would know she didn't want them to 
have anything to po with her will. " 
Mrs. Sargavak again stated her motive for writing the 
letter, to respondent Mabdesian the following day: 
"She said, 'She is always harassing me, nagging me, and 
telling me why we didn't leave anything for her in Harry's 
will, her uncle's will; why we gave so much money to the 
churches and benevolent organizations,' and she said, 'That 
disturbs me. So I told her that is my own money. We can do 
whatever we want with our money.' She says, 'Again yester. 
day she disturbed me and quarreled with me all day, so I 
have written something over here. I want you to take it and 
read it.' 
AI Mabdesian'. testimony quoted in the opinion of the 
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court indicates, Mrs. Sargavak wrote the letter with reference 
to the provisions of an existing will, to inform Mrs. Shoosban 
that she would receive nothing thereunder, and to empower 
Mahdesian to eject Mrs. Shooshan from her house. That she 
did not also intend thereby to direct the disposition of her 
property to Mahdesian and Ohanneson is unequivocally dem-
, onstrated by her answer to Mahdesian's query with respect to 
the allegedly dispositive provision: 
.. ',' "I said, 'Now what do you mean by this, that you want to 
11eave your belongings to your son, Sam Mahdesian and her 
attorney, J. George Ohanneson and give them power of 
attorney!' 
" "Well, she said, 'You are the executor of Harry's estate, 
also you are the executor in my will, and Mr. Ohanneson 
our attorney. I want you folks to prepare and take care of 
estate, my affairs, in the way that you know I want it. 
whenever Lillian Shoostian ever gives any trouble, I 
a"._A9." you to have this.' " 
The declarations of the decedent before and after she wrote 
letter preclude an inference that sh(' intended thereby to 
.... ' .... __ ... - a testamentary disposition of her property. She bad 
aIr'BaOlV executed a formal witnessed will dated July 9, 1945 . 
. her conversations with the nurse and with Mahdesian she 
tiiOn.tiJJlually referred to ,. my will," demonstrating her con-
":"rltofo';nn that it was still operative. . 
is undisputep that decedent's annoyance with Mrs. Shoo-
and her daughter prompted the writing of the letter. 
letter was intended as a notification to Mrs. Shooshan 
she and her daughter would receive nothing under dece-
'8 will. That purpose is clearly established by her state-
to the nurse "that she didn't want them to be in her 
at all, and she was writing this to fix it so they would 
. that she didn't want them to have anything to do with 
. "To accomplish her purpose, Mrs. Sargavak did not 
.' to change her will, since neither Mrs. Sbooshan nor her 
J,GUKlllA::.l'" were mentioned therein. Her reference to the letter 
notification to Mrs. Shooshan and her daugbter that she 
not want them "to have anything to do with her will" 
. that she meant to affirm her will, not to revoke 
existence of a previously executed and unrevoked 
will, to which the testatrix continually referred and 
she still considered operative, reinforces the conclusion 
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that made no reference thereto. (Estate of Spencer, 87 Cal. 
App.2d 591, 598 [197 P.2d 351] ; White v. Deering, 38 Cal. 
App. 433, 438 [177 P. 516] ; Estate of Branick, 172 Cal. 482 
[157 P. 238] ; Estate of Hughes, 140 Cal.App. 97, 100-101 
[35 P.2d 204].) 
This interpretation is confirmed by Mahdesian's uncontra-
dicted testimony as to her explanation of the provision in the 
letter that she left everything to him and Ohanneson. Although 
that provision could be deemed dispository if it stood alone 
(cf., McCloskey v. Tierney, 141 Cal. 101, 102 [74 P. 699, 99 
Am.St.Rep. 33] ; Innes v. Potter, 130 Minn. 320 [153 N.W. 
604]), her explanation that "You are the executor of Harry's 
estate, and also you are the executor in my will, and Mr. 
Ohanneson is our attorney. I want you folks to prepare and 
take care of my estate, my affairs, in the way that you know 
I want it" establishes that she wished her executor and her 
attorney to administer her estate under the terms of the will 
with which as executor and draftsman, respectively, they were 
familiar. Mahdesian was then acting as executor of her hus-
band's will, and she was aware of an executor's responsibility 
for the administration of an estate until final distribution. 
Her purpose was not to make her executor and her attorney her 
legatees, but to provide them with an instrument that would 
demonstrate to Mrs. Shooshan that the latter would get none 
of the property that they were to distribute under her will. 
The evidence makes it clear that Mrs. Sargavak did not 
intend to revoke her will, for her statements demonstrate that 
she regarded that will as still operative. Such was Mahdesian's 
understanding of her statements, although he would have been 
materially benefited by the interpretation urged by respondent 
Ohanneson. After the death of Mrs. Sargavak, Mahdesian 
tried unsuccessfully to get Mrs. Shooshan to leave the house, 
and then consulted Ohanneson as the decedent's attorney: 
"Then I called the attention of this to Mr. Ohanneson, 'Mrs. 
Shoostian refuses to leave, and here is a paper written by 
Mrs. Sargavak to the effect that Mrs. Shoostian is not to get 
anything. ' 
"Then Mr. Ohanneson looked at it, studied it. 'No,' he 
said, 'Sam, that has another meaning, too.' He says, 'You 
and I are becoming the heirs to her estate. ' 
"My attitude in the matter was-I said, 'George, I cannot 
have a share in a thing like this.' I said, 'You have drawn 
Mr. Sargavak's and Mrs. Sargavak's will. You know what 
their desire was. You know what their wiahea were. Mr. 
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Sargavak earned that money and he has passed away, and 
I cannot give an interpretation to this power of attorney in 
this way. I cannot have any share.' 
"Well, he says, 'that is up to you. If you don't want to 
have a part to it, you can waive your claim, but thls is a 
codicil, and half of it comes to you and half of it comes to 
me, and I am going to get my share. ' 
"My next statement to him was, 'George, when I shave in 
· the morning I want to respect myself when I look in the 
· mirror, and I can't do it taking advantage of a thing like 
this.' " 
The trial court could not have reached its conclusion without 
disregarding the foregoing evidence. A trier of fact may dis- . 
· believe unimpeached testimony when its disbelief is warranted 
.' by the motives or interest of the witness or by contradictions 
· appearing in the evidence (Huth v. Katz, 30 Cal.2d 605. 609 
: ' [184 P .2d 521] ), but here there is no basis for disbelief. The 
n,urse had no apparent motive for falsifying her testimony, 
· and respondent suggests none. Mahdesian would have been a 
· legatee of an estate worth approximately $24,000 if tht' letter 
admitted to probate; he had nothing to gain by testifying 
. circumstances establishing that it was not intended as a 
The testimony of both witnesses was completely eon-
a;1I!""'~':U~ with all the evidence adduced at the trial. Respondent 
1!""B't>11'<! no ground upon which the testimony could be disbe-
I ...... V., •. L nor doC's he even contend that it was false. "Testimony 
1I1r,tu~:.b. is not inherently improbable and is not impeached or 
by other evidence should be accepted as true 
trier of fact." ~Gomez v. Oecena, 15 Ca1.2d 363, 366 
P.2d 477] ; Southern Pac. 00. v. Railroad Oom., 13 Ca1.2d 
129 [87 P.2d 1052] ; Nye ~ Nissen, Inc. v. Oentral Surety 
Oorp., 71 Cal.App.2d 570, 576-577 [163 P.2d 
'j Fidelity ~ Oasualty 00. v.' Abraham, 70 Cal.App.2d 
782 [161 P.2d 689] ; Oowan v. Hill, 109 Cal.App. 656, 
[293 P. 871].) An examination of the letter in the light 
,evidence leaves no room for any conclusion other than 
it was not written with testamentary intent. I would 
1S1"II1f0l~ reverse the order admitting the letter to probate. 
J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
~~_vvc.u.'CUJ.'.!:I' and contestants and respondenta' petitions for 
"UU.t::.LrJll..- were denied May 8,1950. Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., 
1iI']'pjlVll,nl". J .• voted for a rehearing. 
